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DR. LAFOREY WINS INTERNATIONAL PRIZE 
FOR MEDICAL ETHICS 
AWARDED POPE ]OHN XXI MEDAL 
Dr. Eugene G. Laforet of Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts was honored by th, 
national Congress of Catholic Doctors for his paper "The 'Hopeless' Case" 
its tenth triennial meeting held in London during early July. As the report 
Congress appearing elsewhere in this issue indicates, the Pope fohn XXI Inter 
Prize for Medical Ethics was instituted by the Association of Portuguese 
in 1952 and it is awarded every third year. 
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Dr. Laforet edits our Abstracts section each quarter and has contributed a 
of excellent articles to LINACR.E QUARTERLY. We value his assistanc• 
Editorial Board and congratulate him most sincerely on receiving this Inte, 
Award. We are very happy to include the prize-winning paper in this Aug, 
It is published with the kind permission of the International Federation of 
Medical Associations from the Acts. (Proceedings of the Congress.) 
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THE "HOPELESS" CASE 
0 God, Who has doomed all men to die, but has concealed from 
all the hour of our death, grant that we may pass our days in 
the practice of holiness and justice .... 
INTRODUCTION 
When, in a given patient, there 
has been established a firm diag­
nosis of a relatively chronic condi­
tion that may be expected to ter­
minate fatally because curative 
treatment is either not known or 
not applicable, the case may prop­
perly be considered "hopeless." 
Under these circumstances medico­
moral problems are almost inevi­
table; they are accentuated when 
the pathogenesis is obscure, when 
remission is .rare, and when the 
general health of the patient is
apparently good. 'Almost b y  com­
mon acceptance the prototype 
"hopeless case" is the patient with 
incurable malignancy. Unfortun­
ately there are many other diseas-
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- Prayer for a Happy Death 
es, such as central nervous ,ystem 
neuropathies, that may re, iily be 
included in this baleful c.-:egory. 
It is evident, but neverth•. less of 
considerable significance, t :1at the 
term "hopeless" in this cc:-1text is 
relative - its limits are defined by 
the current state of medical knowl­
edge. Scientific progress has nar• 
rowed these boundaries in some 
areas and expanded them in others. 
Pernicious anemia, for example.
was stricken from the list by Minot 
and Murphy, and diabetes mallitus 
by Banting and Best. On the other 
hand, Wegener's granulomatosis 
and idiopathic pulmonary hemo• 
siderosis are but two of the poten· 
tially "hopeless" diseases that have
been added to nosology in recent
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years. Indeed, to modern science 
we owe the example par excellence
of the "hopeless case" - the in­
dividual who has accidentally re­
ceived a lethal dose of ionizing ra­
diation, whose early doom is sealed 
beyond doubt, but who, for the 
m o ment, remains completely 
asymptomatic. 
And yet even the stark term 
"hopeless" can perhaps be mitigat­
ed to some extent ... while many 
diseases may be "hopeless" in 
terms of ultimate survival, they 
may be far from so in terms of 
effective palliation and worthwhile 
existence. 
What specific medico-moral dif­
ficulties may be engendered by the 
"hopeless'·· patient? Primarily, of 
course, there may be problems as­
sociated with therapy - for ex­
ample, whether to employ vigorous 
trea.tment or, indeed, whether to 
treat at all. A second important 
facet concerns the imparting of
pertinent medical information -
to the patient, to relatives, and to 
other interested parties. Further, 
the "hopeless" aspect almost neces­
sa rily invites a consideration of 
human experimentation, either re­
lated or unrelated to the disease at 
hand and aimed either at immedi­
ate benefit to the subject or at re­
mote benefit to others. Finally, 
a ssociated intimately with these 
topics hut worthy of separate con­
sideration, certain spiritual aspects
of the "hopeless" patient merit 
comment. In the following pages 
these medico-moral features will be 
discussed individually and an at­
leinpt will be made to draw con­
clusions that are consonant with 
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Christian ethics and accepted med­
ical practice. 
THERAPY 
Every physician, whether or not 
"psychosomatically oriented," ap­
preciates that the dichotomy be­
tween the psyche and the soma, 
between the spiritual and the phys­
ical, is artificial and arbitrary. It 
is, however, a convenient distinc­
tion. and one that permits a certain 
analytic approach not otherwise 
possible. In spite of the foregoing, 
the physician has traditionally been 
concerned more with the outward 
aspects of disease than with its 
subtler feat�res, and the following 
discussion of "therapy" specifically 
excludes such modalities as are 
primarily spiritual. psychiatric, or 
sociologic. 
What norms, then, does one em­
ploy in the physical treatment of 
the "hopeless case"? The spectrum 
varies widely; it ranges from the 
deliberate and direct extinction of 
life to vigorous efforts at maintain­
ing a semblance of vitality in a 
mo ribund patient. Certainly be­
tween these extremes, but not al­
ways susceptible of precise defini­
tion. lies the Christian attitude. 
Euthanasia: The directly intend­
ed and procured death of a patient 
in order to terminate suffering has 
been designated "euthanasia." It 
is probably coeval with the history 
of mankind. Regardless of motive, 
it constitutes an intrinsically evil 
act and as such is not licit. "Thou 
shalt not kill" permits of no other 
interpretation. 
May not a physician, however, 
act with propriety and as a mere 
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agent in ending the life of a patient 
who desires and consents to eu­
thanasia? Because man exercises 
only custodial privileges in this 
matter, such consent cannot validly 
be granted. 
Fundamental to any considera­
tion of euthanasia is the fact that 
pain and suffering, while physical 
evils, are morally indeterminate, 
neither good nor evil per se. Con­
sequently any argument based 
upon the premise that pain and 
suffering are intrinsically evil is 
fallacious. 
Prescinding from moral consid­
erations, Kamisar1 has presented 
virtually unassailable arguments 
against euthanasia. In brief, he 
holds that the risk of error and 
abuse is so large that permissive 
legislation regarding euthanasia 
would be impracticable. 
Unconscionable Prolongation of 
Vital Functions: Technologic ad­
vances have made it possible to 
maintain for a considerable interval 
a semblance of vitality in a mori­
bund. or actually dead, patient. 
Respiratory movements can be in­
duced extrinsically, as with a res­
pirator, and cardiac function simi­
larly, as with electrical stimulation 
or mechanical support. Under 
these conditions, however, one is 
dealing not with a living human 
being but with a functioning 
human heart-lung preparation. 
Such measures hardly seem war­
ranted in the case of a chronically 
ill patient in whom cessation of 
respiratory or cardiac activity is 
but the final outward manifestation 
of death. Undue prolongation of 
vital functions, therefore, may or 
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may not be licit, depending 
the intent of the physician. 
tional elements to be conside1 
elude charity to the patier. 
justice to the relatives. H 
even unreasonable prolonga. 
vital functions, unlike euth 
is not intrinsically evil. it is c 
that a firm and unqualified 
ment regarding its moralit; 
possible. 
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ddi­
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The Middle 
nary" versus 
Ground: Ordi­
" Extraor nary" 
Means: 
Thou shalt not kill but 
not strive 
Officiously to keep a/1 
ed 
In the present context ti temp­
tation to quote this Shavia ouplet 
is · well-nigh insuperable, articu ­
larly since it seems to ate so 
succinctJy the crux of the •oblem. 
Like so many other feli< Jus ex• 
pressions, however, it ri s over­
simplification. What, for xample, 
is "officious" striving? Ir ,he suc­
ceeding paragraphs this . d relat· 
ed topics will be discus� !. 
As a guide to the s ution of 
difficulties involved in t'. present 
subject the Church ma�,s a dis· 
tinction between "ordi1, ry" and 
"extraordinary" mean. Thus. 
there is a moral obligation to take 
all "ordinary" means to preserve 
life and health, but res, rt to "ex­
traordinary" means is optional.
2 
It is obvious that a u111versal def­
inition of these terms is impossible. 
since such circumstances as time. 
place, and person may constitute 
the final determinants. Once the 
principle has been enunciated, 
therefore, the Church wisely defers 
to the judgment of the interested 
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parties. It is at this level of "prac­
tical ethics" that the major difficul­
ties arise. 
While not necessarily confined 
to the "hopeless case," the problem 
of ultra-radical surgery requires 
consideration here because of the 
implicit suggestion that without 
such means a potentially curable 
patient may become "hopeless," or 
a "hopeless" patient may be denied 
palliation. A classic contribution 
in this matter has been made by 
Ford and Drew,3 who list the fol­
lowing factors that must be 
weighed by the physician-coun­
selor: 
I. The patient's spiritual well­
.being: While not a prime re­
sponsibility of the physician, 
this element must be considered 
when advising radical surgery.
"Is the patient prepared to
.die?" and "Would he be pre-
pared, or better prepared, if his 
life were prolonged?" are quer­
ies of importance. 
2. The patient's own desire to 
continue his life by extraordi­
nary means: The balanced 
judgment of the patient must
be considered. 
3. The expected length of survi­
val and the degree of comfort
expected: These should be 
commensurate with the drastic
procedure contemplated.
i. The effect of the patient's sur­
vival on his associates: This
includes such elements as stress
and strain on the members of 
the family and the cost of con­
tinuous medical care.
5, The advancement of science:
This is considered an important
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reason for advising radical sur­
gery only when the patient 
wishes to contribute to science 
in this manner, or when it does 
not conflict in any way with his 
personal interest. 
In medically evaluating the jus­
tification of radical cancer surgery 
Whipple� has cited the following 
factors as important: 1. threat of 
the disease, 2. operative risk, 3. the 
probability of cure and long term 
survival. 1. the assurance of relief 
of symptoms, even though pallia­
tive or temporary, and 5. the abil­
ity of the patient to adapt to the 
dysfunction or deformity that may 
result. In a similar vein, Stone5, 6
has contended that the feasibility 
of technical success in ultra-radical 
surgery does not per se justify 
these operations and that such 
factors as patient comfort and ex­
pense must be considered. In short, 
then, extraordinary surgical means 
may be employed in a given patient 
but only when all of several factors 
have been conscientiously evalu­
ated. 
What norms govern the use of 
extraordinary non-surgical means 
in the " hopeless" patient? Accord­
ing to Collins,7 "No physician is 
obligated to institute extraordinary 
measures to save life, especially un­
der impossible circumstances." In 
support of this view, he refers to 
the reply of Pope Pius XIIS to a 
question asked by delegates to the 
International Congress of Anes­
thetists in 1957. The query con­
cerned the right, or obligation, of 
the anesthetist to use modern tech­
nics of artificial respiration in all 
cases of deep unconsciousness, 
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"even in those that are considered 
completely hopeless." To this the 
Pope replied, "Since these forms 
of treatment go beyond the ordi­
nary means to which one is bound, 
it cannot be held that there is an 
obligation to use them." 
It is the management of the 
"hopeless" patient who actually is 
dying of the underlying disease 
that has stimulated so much recent 
discussion. In this situation, inten­
sive efforts to maintain life have 
been stigmatized, perhaps rightly, 
as a "prolongation of dying" rather 
than of living. There is no dispute 
that a prime aim is to assure the 
comfort of the patient, even if such 
therapy results in a shortening of 
life-expectancy. Certainly the use 
of expensive and painful means of 
adding a few hours of life to a dy­
ing patient is not in keeping with 
Christian charity. There has been 
considerable discussion about the 
"quantity" versus "quality" of life, 
about "fruitless longevity. "9, 10, 11 
Obviously it is not wise to increase 
quantity of life at the expense of  
quality, or to  strive for fruitless 
longevity. But however nicely such 
phrases may describe the problem, 
they do not contribute significantly 
to its solution. Who, for example, 
is to determine how much "quality" 
exists in a given life, or when lon­
gevity is "fruitless"? While mere 
preservation of life should not be  
considered an end in itself, there is  
reason to  believe that recent writ­
ers accord too liberal an interpre­
tation to "extraordinary means." 
In the "hopeless" patient who is  
dying but not moribund, vigorous 
and considerate therapy aimed at 
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increasing both the "quantit) and 
the "quality" of life certain · re­
quires no defence. If a d, ision 
need be made, it would seem viser 
for the physician to err on tl side 
of active treatment rather than 
laissez fa ire. Cogent reaso ; for 
this opinion may be addu· d as 
follows: 
I. The physician is fallib and
the case may not be mr ;cally 
"hopeless."
2. The physician by tradit n has
been committed to acti con­
tention with disease. 
3. The physician is not co• .Jetent 
to determine fully the ''t ·ality" 
of a given life or whet'. r lon­
gevity is "fruitless." 
4. Even if without posit e act, 
the physician who a, ogates 
to hi.mself the prerog , ive of 
determining whether I e shall 
·continue or terminate •.)y de­
fault is in an uncon ortable 
moral position. 
5. The imminent discovery of new 
curative agents is a , ever­
present possibility.*
6. Spontaneous regression of ma· 
lignancies in apparently "hope­
less" patients has been docu­
mented.12 
7. Miraculous intervention is 
possible. 
8. The physician may find that
self-recrimination at errors of 
omission is harsher than at 
errors of commission. 
9. Even a brief moment of mental
lucidity in a moribund patient 
• As an outstanding example, the advent 
of methotrexate has radically altered the 
outlook in metastatic choriocarcinoma, 
previous] y uniformly fatal. 
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may be all-important for his 
spiritual welfare. 
10. "Extraordinary" means of
treatment may result in cure. 
Management of Pain and Other 
Distressing Symptoms in the 
"Hopeless Case"; Use of Drugs:
Because long-continued pain is 
such a basic element in much of 
the preceding discussion, particu­
larly with respect to euthanasia. it 
may be well here to consider this 
aspect of the "hopeless case." Ac­
cording to Perese,13 patients with 
malignant disease ordinarily do not 
have severe pain corresponding in 
intensity to that of renal colic, 
thermal burn of the skin, or facial 
neuralgia. The pain of malignant 
disease, however, differs from that 
of benign. ·conditions in one impor­
tant feature, its duration. The 
mild, dull, aching, persistent pain 
of the cancer patient erodes physi­
cal and mental reserves alike. By 
individualizing the approach it was 
found possible to effect substantial 
and long-term relief of pain in the 
majority of patients without resort 
to marked obtundation by nar­
cotics. Medical, surgical, or radia­
tion therapy was employed, alone 
or in combination. 
Similar conclusions have been 
reported by Exton-Smith, H who 
found that only a quarter of 33 
patients terminally ill with cancer 
bad moderate or severe pain and 
that this could be controlled by 
judicious use of narcotics. Further, 
of the 220 terminally ill patients 
comprising the entire study, other 
distressing symptoms such as nau­
sea, vomiting, dyspnea, and dys­
phagia occurred in only I 7 
(7.7%). 
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What of the small minority of 
"hopeless" patients who do have 
persistent, severe, and distressing 
symptoms? This problem is par­
ticularized in a recent monograph15 
as follows: "In the face of severe 
Ii fe threatening hemorrhage from 
the bronchi in the incurable pa­
tient, heavy sedation and the lib­
eral use of narcotics is not only 
justified but mandatory to allay the 
patient's apprehension even though 
their use may hasten death." This 
attitude is fully consonant with 
Christian ethics and susceptible of 
formal defence by the principle of 
the double effect. It might also be 
argued that failure to use narcotics 
in this situation would constitute 
an extraordinary means of pre­
serving life. 
In summary, euthanasia is intrin­
sically evil and is not licit. Un­
reasonable attempts to maintain a 
semblance of vitality in a moribund 
or actually dead patient may offend 
the virtues of charity or justice. 
There is a moral obligation to take 
all "ordinary" means to preserve 
life and health, but resort to "ex­
traordinary" means is optional. 
There is no universal definition of 
what constitutes "ordinary" or 
"extraordinary" means since cir­
cumstances constitute the final de­
terminants. In general, it is wiser 
for the physician to err on the side 
of active therapy. Pain in the pa­
tient with "hopeless" malignancy 
is usually not severe and responds 
readily to thoughtful treatment. 
IMPARTING INFORMATION 
A major problem in managing 
the "hopeless case" concerns the 
imparting of pertinent diagnostic 
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and prognostic information to the 
patient and to other interested per­
sons. Because this facet of the 
"hopeless case" is so intimately re­
lated to psychologic and sociologic 
management, these aspects are also 
considered in this section. While 
equally applicable to all "hopeless" 
diseases, the discussion will be 
concerned primarily with malig­
nancy. since it is this disease that 
evokes the greatest emotional re­
sponse. 
"Resolved: That the Patient 
Should Always Be Told 'the 
Truth'": Considerable debate, 
some of it producing more heat 
than light, has centered about this 
subject. Attitudes range from an 
uncomprom,smg negative to an 
unyielding affirmative. Most opin­
ions, however, while favoring one 
approach, admit of exceptions. 
In point of fact, the entire emo­
tion-charged difficulty rests upon 
an untenable premise, viz., that 
"the truth" in any given instance 
can be known to the physician. 
What is "the truth"? That the pa­
tient will live 3 months? Or 3 
years? That there will be pain? 
That radiation therapy will not 
effect marked palliation? That a 
curative chemotherapeutic agent 
will not be found? That the patient 
will not die of an unrelated myo­
cardial infarct tomorrow? It is a 
little paradoxical that the medical 
profession, usually so circumspect, 
conservative, and· cautious, should 
assume this aura of omniscience in 
the prec1,,e disease-category where 
reliable information is most lack­
ing. neoplasia. As a result one 
conceivably could make short shrift 
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of the entire problem by mai1 ain­
ing that the patient cannot b told 
"the truth" because this � nply 
cannot be determined. To , so, 
however, would be to igno the 
numerous complexities assr ated 
with this subject. 
It must not be concluded, 1ere­
fore, that "the truth" in this { ntext 
has no meaning, but rather ,at it 
requires definition. What, , !n, is 
"the truth"? Essentially it best 
clinical judgment of the pr 
concerning the expected cc 
;ician 
se of 
ith a events in a given patient 
given diagnosis. It is a 1tistic 
applied to a person and as 1ch is 
intrinsically inaccurate. P. .  uarial 
tables indicating that an oct 
ian has exceeded his life 
ancy do not prove that he 
ienar­
,pect­
dead. 
Telling the Truth - Le: ,I As­
pects: Relating as it does prop­
erty rights. the making o <1 will, 
and other forensic matters 
surprising that a considera 
of legal opinion is availab. 
question of whether to tel 
tient the truth. Is there 
obligation to inform the h 
ill patient of his diagn 
prognosis? While an ur 
answer is not possible, tl, 
l is not 
,e body 
on the 
the pa-
a legal 
.Jelessly 
,is and 
1ualifled
gist of 
most opinions is that sud .• m onus 
does exist.16 
According to Regan. 1' 
It is extremely doubtful that ., physician 
has a therapeutic privilege to "'ithhold .• specific diagnosis from a patiL'nt who is 
sick with serious or fatal illness. To the 
contrary, the confidential relationship re­
quires in ordinary circumstancl'S that the 
physician make a frank and full dis· 
closure of all the pertinent facts to any 
adult and mentally competent patient. 
While the precise amount of de­
tail required to constitute "the
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truth" is usually conceded to be 
debatable, the legal principle seems 
clear. In his pertinent review 
Taylor16 states, 
The patient has a right to know the truth 
All lawyers will agree that a doctor may 
not breach his duty to his patient through 
deceit or a lie. The doctor's duty to tell 
the patient of his critical condition so he 
can put his worldly and spiritual affairs 
in order does not require the doctor to 
disclose all of the diagnostic data in 
detail, or to tell him the precise nature 
of his illness. A doctor may reasonably 
presume that a patient does not desire 
knowledge which would injure rather 
than help, but the doctor may not rely 
upon this presumption contrary to the pa­
tie nt's known desire for full knowledge. 
In the legal sphere, then, which 
codifles man's behavior as a social 
animal, there appear to exist no 
permissive opinions by which the 
physician may justify a course of 
deliberate deceit. Precisely what 
constitutes deceit, however, re­
mains moot. 
Telling the Truth-Psycho/ogic 
Aspects: Despite the fact that 
there are many diseases more un­
predictable, disabling, and lethal. 
no diagnosis imparts the emotional 
or psychologic impact of "cancer." 
The very derivation of the word 
suggests fear and horror. Under 
these circumstances, therefore. in­
forming the patient of this diag­
nosis may evoke grave psychologi­
cal stresses. It is likely, however. 
that these stresses may actually be 
greater if such information is with­
held. 
A major source of difficulty for 
the "hopeless" cancer patient is the 
sense of isolation that is foisted 
upon him. As Rothenberg IS states: 
Communication is characteristically dis­
napted in terminal cancer to a greater 
fltent than in almost any other illness. 
Patients are frequent! y not told that they 
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have cancer or that they arc dying ... 
Although withholding this information 
may seem justified in a particular case, 
it must be borne in mind that this inevit­
ably results in disrupted communication 
on all ·sides and creates other problems. 
For one thing, an almost unavoidable ef­
fect of a disruption of communication is 
an increase in the patient's isolation and 
loneliness. 
In some cases the physician may feel that 
information about the patient s disease 
should be withheld from him in spite of 
the potential danger of isolation. The 
important principle in management is 
simply to be aware of the trouble spots, 
not to take a dogmatically rigid position 
on them .... The temptation to support 
processes such as denial, magical thinking, 
and the avoidance of issues stimulating 
unrealistic guilt may be dictated by the 
physician's inner conviction that death 
cannot be faced realistically by patient 
or by himself. This is not a necessary 
assumption. 
A reason frequently advanced 
for not informing a patient is the 
possibility of a cataclysmic psychi­
atric response, perhaps leading to 
suicide. The ability of the average 
patient to cope with the truth, how­
ever is often underestimated by the 
physician. After the initial shock 
there is usually successful adapta­
tion and adjustment. Adequate 
statistics are not available but 
suicide as a direct consequence of 
learning the truth seems rare.19, 20 
In most cases, therefore, there 
appear to be compelling psycho­
logic reasons for adequately in­
forming the patient of his diagnosis 
and prognosis. 
Telling the Truth - Medical 
Aspects: Do specifically medical 
reasons exist for making a patient 
privy to his diagnosis and prog­
nosis? Certainly when disfiguring 
or disabling palliative surgery is 
indicated the patient will wish to 
be informed of the reason for such 
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measures. And when potentially 
hazardous drugs are employed he 
should be told both of their risk 
and indication. Furthermore, a pa­
tient whose symptoms prove re­
fractory to therapy may frequently 
be dissuaded from vain and expen­
sive recourse to other physicians or 
clinics only by disclosure of the 
nature of his disease. 
Although these medical reasons 
in favor of informing the patient 
may seem weak and inconclusive, 
it should be indicated that purely 
medical reasons for not doing so 
are virtually non-existent. 
What are the attitudes of the 
laity and of the profession toward 
this issue? In most studies based 
upon patient response there has 
been a marked preference for be­
ing told the truth,21, 22 and serious 
problems resulting from this policy 
have not been frequent. Physi­
cians, on the other hand, show a 
decided preference for not telling 
the truth. Fitts and Ravdin,23 in 
. a study based on 114 physicians, 
found that 70 per cent either never 
informed the patient or usually did 
not, while only 30 per cent always 
or usually did so. Ninety per cent 
of physicians in a more recent sur­
vey24 indicated a preference for 
not telling. According to this in­
vestigation: 
Although clinical experience was cited by 
three-quarters (of physicians) as the 
major policy determinant, the data bear 
no relation to experience or age. Instead, 
inconsistencies, opinionatedness, and re.­
sistance to change arid to research were 
found which indicated emotion-laden a 
priori personal judgments as the real de­
terminants. Feared reactions to telling 
(e.g., suicide) could rarely be substanti­
ated. Equally undocumented assumptions 
were given as justifications for telling. 
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Underlying were feelings of pes nism 
and futility about cancer. The ,ong 
feelings mobilized by our deep and ·ious 
concern for cancer patients, and ou Jilli­
culties in helping them, stimulate ·!Dial 
mechanisms. These responses, un rtun� 
ately, operate as interferences to p gress 
in cancer therapy. 
In 1946, Lund2., concluded 
The doctor is bound in his duty :, hi, 
patient to do whatever is best r his 
patient and to avoid doing him h,. 1. In 
discussing his patient's conditic the 
doctor realizes that there are so • cir• 
cumstances when he cannot, for e pa­
tient's own good, tell him the vhole 
truth." However, there arc otl · fre� 
quent circumstances in which frie s and 
relatives want the "whole trutl, ( un-
pleasant) kept from the patient 1en it 
is much better for the patient r the 
doctor to be quite frank. 
In brief, we seem to  be ·aced 
with the startling paradox , at as 
patients more and more i. Iicate 
a preference for being inf med, 
physicians are becoming me · and 
more reluctant to do so. S· cula­
tion on the reason for this , vain, 
but it may be that preocc• ,ation 
with sophisticated diagno, and 
advanced instrumentation 1 s ex­
erted a dehumanizing influe ce on 
the modern physician who, aving 
less intimate knowledge of t' c spir• 
itual resources of his pat �nt, is 
apt grossly to underestimaL them. 
Telling the Truth - P.actical 
Aspects: Certain practical factors 
influence the decision to inform the 
patient, and to do so truth fully. If 
the physician imparts a distorted 
version of the actual state of af­
fairs, he may experience difficulty 
in repeating it accurately at a later 
date. "A liar," said Quintilian, 
"should have a good memory." 
The problem is further compound­
ed if more than one physician is 
involved. 
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In point of fact, there are prob­
ably few "hopeless" cancer pa­
tients who do not realize the diag­
nosis and prognosis, even though 
they may be unwilling to verbalize 
it to themselves. What intelligent 
patient can go daily to a Cancer 
Institute for radiation therapy and 
not suspect the diagnosis? What 
patient can report for inordinately 
frequent follow-up examinations 
and not suspect? What patient can 
undergo extensive extirpative sur­
gery and not suspect? As a corol­
lary to this, patients have occasion­
ally stated that the really insur­
mountable burden was not the 
knowledge of the disease but the 
difficulty of trying to satisfy family 
or physician by pretending not to 
know. 
In addition, the patient who 
learns that he has been deliberately 
misled will find it impossible to re­
pose any tuture confidence in his 
medical advisor. This will often 
occur at a juncture in the patient's 
illness when such confidence i's 
necessary for adequate treatment. 
Finally, a patient with financial 
or family obligations may be 
spared imprudent or disasttous 
decisions only by receiving full 
prognostic information. 
Telling the Truth-Moral (Eth­
ical) and Spiritual Aspects: In 
response to a patient's direct ques­
tion a direct lie is never morally 
justifiable. "Thou shalt not bear 
false witness .. . " But apart from 
this explicit prohibitive dictum, 
human dignity demands that the 
patient have opportunity of know­
ing the truth.26, 21 This does not 
always involve a detailed explana-
AucusT, 1962 
tion of all medical facets of the 
case, but it does require a practical 
and honest presentation of what is 
neces.sary and suitable for the pa­
tient to know. 
A patient's dignity as a Chris­
tian, too, demands that he have 
access to the truth. "To retard by 
silence," said Pope Pius XII, "a 
sick person's preparation for the 
grand passage to eternity can be a 
grave fault." Directive 7 of Ethi­
cal and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Hospitals28 is quite spe­
cific on this point: 
Everyone has the right and the duty to 
prepare for the solemn moment of death. 
Unless it is dear, therefore, that a dying 
patient is already well-prepared for death, 
as regards both temporal and spiritual 
affairs, it is the physician's duty to inform, 
or to have some responsible person impart 
this information. 
There are, therefore, explicit 
prohibitions against lying to a pa­
tient, as well as cogent reasons for 
actively informing him of the truth. 
An unqualified statement of obli­
gation, however, is not possible. 
As a guide in these circum­
stances, Lynch29 states: 
. . .. a doctor's strict moral duty to in­
form the patient would seem to include 
only I. information necessary to the pa­
tient in order to insure successful therapy, 
and 2. foreknowledge in proper time of 
approaching death .... The moral prin­
ciple involved is altogether clear: act 
always in the best interests of the patient. 
Speaking as a psychiatrist, 
Meyer:io similarly suggests that 
there is a hierarchy of obligations 
and that the precept to "do no 
harm" may take precedence over 
"the process that is quaintly called 
telling the truth." 
Telling the Family and Others: 
In general there would seem to be 
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an obligation in justice. and prob­
ably in charity, to inform at least 
one responsible member of the pa­
tient's family in pertinent diag­
nostic and prognostic matters. This 
is particularly so if the patient is 
unaware of the facts, and in this 
situation the obligation would ap­
pear to have legal roots as well. 
How far does this onus extend? 
Certainly not beyond the immedi­
ate family, unless there are others 
whose social or business connec­
tions with the patient are such that 
a valid claim to information may 
be made. 
In keeping with the growing be­
lief that the patient should be suit­
ably informed is the tendency to 
inform the family as well. West­
berg�1 has presented a considered 
Christian exposition of why this 
approach is desirable and how best 
to accomplish it. 
One of the difficulties that may 
arise when pertinent information is 
not available to all interested par­
. ties has been stated by Kline and 
Sobin:32 
vi some cases, when the family has 
knowledge and the patient has not, the 
patient himself exerts much pressure to 
find out "what the doctor said." At times, 
strong guilt feelings may be created in  
the family if  they have to tell deliberate 
lies, and sometimes the situation can be 
helped if the statement to the family is 
worded in an equivocal manner; however, 
it should still be clear. 
Christopher,'13 a strong propon­
ent of the "do not tell" school, in­
dicates that he has, on a rare occa­
sion when he had decided to inform 
the patient, refrained from doing 
so at the behest of the family. Al-
. though the advice of the family in 
this matter should certainly be 
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carefully weighed, there shoul be 
no infringement on the direc, .Ja­
tient-physician relationship w ch, 
in its own sphere, is as intima as 
that of patient with family. Al­
though considerable pressure .:an 
be brought to bear on the phy• ian 
by the family, strictly speakin the 
latter would seem to have no xal 
or legal right to interfere ii this 
matter. Conversely, and fu • in 
keeping with the relations!. , of 
patient with physician, the p ient 
may insist that the family r • be 
informed, a stricture that th, ihy­
sician is bound to respect. 
How to Tell the Truth: I has 
been intimated, "telling the uth" 
is not synonymous with a b tally 
frank, concise, clinical recit;i m of 
diagnostic and prognostic fe s. It 
should always be done ntly. 
compassionately, and si1• ·rely. 
Hope should not be dash I but 
positively encouraged, a J 3ition 
easy to assume in these t' ys of 
rapid medical progress. J .  alism 
should be tempered with op rnism. 
veracity with charity. ('I little 
thought will make it clear o you 
that charity and veracity, b th be­
ing commended by God, annot 
possibly be in real conflict e .r. "34) 
A practical norm in thi� matter 
is never to volunteer inform ,tion or 
gratuitously to expand on a, ailable 
data. In general, the patknt will 
make obvious how much he wishes 
to know. For example, in response 
to his query regarding what was 
found at operation one might reply. 
"A tumor." Many patients will not 
pursue the matter further. For 
those who do. information in re­
sponse to direct questioning might 
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include the fact that the tumor was 
malignant, but of low grade, and 
that all gross disease was removed. 
It is usually simple and expedient 
to be guided by the patient. 
For the patient who must under­
go surgery, a full preoperative dis­
cussion of the possibilities will go 
far toward obviating later difficul­
ties. Certainly, when the surgeon 
must recommend a serious opera­
tion for malignancy. this possibility 
should be mentioned to any patient 
who might otherwise be inclined to 
temporize dangerously. In general, 
however, the surgeon can honestly 
adopt an attitude of uncertainty 
concerning the precise diagnosis. 
With specific reference to lung 
tumors, for example. the patient 
may be told that much will depend 
on.the findings at operation - that 
some tumors are best treated by 
resection and that this will be done 
if indicated; that others respond 
better to radiation and this will be 
learned from biopsy of the lesion; 
and that for some a combination of 
excision and radiation is indicated. 
Thus the ground-work is laid for 
an acceptable explanation to the 
patient if the lesion is non-resect­
able, or if there is an indication for 
post-operative radiation therapy. 
"Telling the patient," then, is a 
gradual process. not an abrupt rev­
elation. 
Semantics play a great role in 
this matter, with the word "cancer" 
being accorded entirely unwarrant­
ed connotations by physician and 
patient alike. It is therefore impor­
tant. if the patient asks. "Is it can­
cer?", to explain that "cancer" 
means many things of diverse im-
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port and that it is rot really a 
meaningful word. It may be help­
ful to make an analogy with the 
word "infection," explaining that 
etiologies, prognoses, and manifes­
tations of infections are so varied 
that the unqualified noun is almost 
meaningless. And so it is with 
"cancer." 
To conclude, there are pertinent 
legal. psychologic, medical. prac­
tical. moral. and spiritual reasons 
for informing the patient. Secon­
darily. there are strong indications 
for informing the patient's family. 
In this context, however, "the 
truth" is not an absolute entity but 
merely a �atter of clinical judg­
ment. The patient should be in­
formed gently, compassionately, 
sincerely. and gradually. While 
the arguments in favor of ade­
quately and suitably informing the 
patient are almost incontrovertible, 
the fundamental moral principle 
remains: Act always in the best 
interests of the patient. 
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
General Principles: A consider­
ation of human experimentation is 
unavoidable in any discussion of 
the patient who is hopelessly ill 
with a chronic disease. The mere 
fact of hopelessness suggests itself 
as a circumstance that might miti­
gate the ethical obligations sur­
rounding such experimentation. In 
the case of the hopeless patient 
these studies might be directly re­
lated to the disease at hand or en­
tirely unrelated to it. Further. the 
objective might be either immediate 
benefit to the subject or remote 
benefit to others. 
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Regardless of the scope or in­
tent, however, the medico-moral 
conditions that must be met bdore 
proceeding with human experimen­
tation on the "hopeless case" differ 
in no respect from those obtaining 
when the subject is healthy. The 
enlightened consent and desire of 
the subject is imperative, the risk 
must not be inordinate, and the 
cause must be proportionately 
grave. The attitude of the Church 
has been fully and explicitly pre­
sented by Pope Pius XII in a now­
famous allocution.35 Ladimer36, 37
and Beecher38 have reviewed the 
problem comprehensively from 
medical. legal. and moral asi-,ects. 
Experimentation on the "Hope­
less Case": With specific refer­
ence to the topic at hand, Beech­
er'18 has assumed a firm attitude: 
.... the use of the "hopelessly incurable" as experimental subjects has developed re­
cently. I have already stated the reasons 
for my deep conviction that those who are in imminent danger of death should not be 
subjected to experimentation, except as 
part of the therapeutic effort for the ben­efit of the subjeot himself. Occasionally, 
reports are found wherein use of the "hopelessly incurable" seems to justify 
dangerous experimentation. The error in this .appears evident. It is not the physi­cian s prerogative to make or to profit 
from such dubious judgments. 
Human experimentation on the 
"hopeless case" has also been dis­
cussed extensively by Guttentag:39 
This question illustrates the chaos that results when the two aspects of the patient-physician relationship are not 
recognized, and no conscious attempt is made to separate the two. All - the scienc<.! of medicine, t,he suffering patient, 
the physician-experimenter, and the phy­
sician-friend - lose by this confusion. 
The literature suggests that the classifi­cation of persons as "hopelessly sick" is 
not intended to be merely a presentation of fact in the objective sense on the part 
of the experimenter, but, by its character-
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ization as "hopeless," is intended to ;ti/y ater 
t to 
an experimenter's self-permit for 
boldness. It is an apparent atte� 
express a conscious effort of restrc1 t on his part when, in performing expe tents that endanger the lives of the expe 
ed-on sick, the experimenter restric, 
1ent ... him­It is self to those "marked by death.' meant to be noble in the democrati, yet it unconsciously challenges thi more sub ti y but no less than the 
pirit, 
spirit .;e of pt of ;J the 
force, because it violates the con equality or brotherhood in violat 
principle of the original patient-pl 
relationship. From the experi, point of view, the description "ho 
incurable" is not germane to his , 
5ician nter's lessly 
The designation is inadequate. b, does not specify the time element 
•pose. use it 
hope­years? erned, f their 
,ssibil­within dpoint 
ion is r. To
ent be-
less within hours, days, month, 
And, if months or years are co do all experts agree on the status 
respective sciences and deny the ity of discovering effective agen 
such a period? ... From the st of the physician-friend, the ass 
not germane to his purpose, ei him it is an expression of detach 
tween physician and patient. 
nouncement of a scale of partn• 
domination. quite contrary to it• spirit. As a matter of fact, it c.­paradox that the healthier th, the more he should be the cone 
physician; the sicker, the less. 
1e an# 
nip vs. ,riginal 1tes the patient. 
t of his 
Claude Bernard, too, h, wres­
tled with this problem: 4 o 
Others have made analogous ex criments on patients with phthisis doon. d to an early death . .. As experimer of this kind are of great interest to sc , nee and 
can be conclusive only on man, .ney seem 
to be wholly permissible when they in· volve no suffering or harm to t ,r subject of the experiment. For we mL ,, not de­ceive ourselves, morals do h>t forbid making experiments on one's neighbor or on one 's self; in  everyday hfe men do nothing but experiment on one another. Christian morals forbid only one thing, doing ill to one's neighbor. Sr,, among the experiments that may be tri�d on man. those that can only harm are forbidden, those that are innocent are permissible, 
and those that may do good are obliga­tory. 
It would appear evident from the 
foregoing, therefore, that human 
experimentation involving the 
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hopelessly ill is not of itself for­
bidden, provided the ethical stric­
tures surrounding an·y human ex­
perimentation are observed. It is 
also evident. however, that this 
specific form of human experimen­
tation is fraught with the danger 
of self-deceit for the experimenter 
and of injustice to the subject. 
Donations of Tissues or Organs: 
Somewhat related to the problem 
of human experimentation is that 
of tissue or organ donation. Real­
ization of the imminence of death 
and the acquiring of a sense of true 
values may impel the "hopeless" 
patient to arrange for the post 
mortem donation of such tissues or 
organs as may be of value to the 
living. Donation of eyes for cor­
neal grafts would be a case in 
point. This is an entirely accept­
able and commendable act of 
Christian charity, and in no way 
conflicting with medico-moral 
standards.41 Donation inter vivos, 
however, raises difficulties that are 
less easily resolved.42 This is 
largely due to the fact that only 
recently have tissue and organ 
transplantations of this type 
emerged from the realm of philo­
sophical speculation to that of 
medical fact, and there has not 
been opportunity for a considerable 
body of theological opinion to ac­
cumulate. However, certain state­
ments of pertinent norms are avail­
able,43 indication that transplanta­
tion inter vivos is licit if the opera­
tion does not gravely endanger the 
life of the donor or impair his 
functional integrity. In general. it 
seems certain that the same ethical 
considerations obtain when the 
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prospective donor is a "hopeless 
case" as when he is healthy. At 
present, much of this discussion is 
theoretical because patients with 
malignant disease are not usually 
considered medically acceptable as 
tissue donors. 
To conclude, human experimen­
tation upon the hopelessly ill pa­
tient is permissible provided estab­
lished ethical norms are respected. 
The matter, however, is one of 
great sensitivity and difficulty. 
Tissue or organ donation by the 
"hopeless case" is licit if moral 
safeguards are observed; the ethi­
cal problems are greater with 
transplantations inter vivos than 
with post mortem donations. 
SPIRITUAL ASPECTS 
As one whose perception of eter­
nal values is sharpened by the evi­
dent proximity of death, the hope­
lessly ill patient may pose problems 
of a unique spiritual nature. In 
addition, it is with respect to the 
"hopeless case" that miraculous 
intervention assumes its greatest 
pertinence. 
The Last Sacraments: These in­
clude Penance, Holy Eucharist re­
ceived as Viaticum, and Extreme 
Unction.44, 45 The importance to 
the Catholic patient of their worthy 
reception cannot be overstated.46 
Arrangements to this end should 
be made well before the patient is 
moribund or comatose, because an 
adequate mental status is manda­
tory for the unconditional recep­
tion of Penance and for the ordi­
nary reception of the Eucharist. In 
this connection a recent study47 
lends support to the contention 
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that there are few medical contra­
indications to the reception of Holy 
Communion by the ill, except for 
mental incompetence, defective 
sensorium, and intractable vomit­
ing. 
The question of informing the 
patient of his prognosis, treated in 
the preceding section, has a par­
ticular relevance here. In the first 
place, full knowledge of the true 
medical outlook would more likely 
prompt the patient to set his spir­
itual house in order then if perti­
nent information were withheld. 
Secondly, it is difficult to believe 
that a knowledgeable Catholic pa­
tient could receive the Last Sacra­
ments without being cognizant of 
the prognostic implication. 
Miracles: A physical miracle in­
volving the supernatural cure of a 
hopelessly ill patient is an extra­
ordinary occurrence almost by def­
inition. Instances have been docu­
mented, however, beginning with 
the miracles of Christ and extend­
ing even to our own day. In an 
autobiographical note Alexis Car­
rel48 has described the miraculous 
cure at Lourdes in I 903 of a young 
girl "hopelessly ill" with tubercu­
lous peritonitis. Miracles in gen­
eral. and modern miraculous cures 
in particular, have been ably dis­
cussed by Dr. Franc;ois Leuret, 
former President of  the Lourdes 
Medical Bureau, and Dr. Henri 
Bon.4fl Since, as mentioned pre­
viously.12 spontaneous regression 
of malignancy has occasionally 
been recorded, the supernatural 
origin of miracles manifest in this 
fashion might be called into doubt. 
However, there are two marks that 
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serve to distinguish mirac· ous 
cures of this nature: 49 J. the ure 
must be instantaneous, and 2. :ere 
must be complete absence 01 any 
convalescence. In none of the 
spontaneously regressing ca cers 
collected by Everson and C lei� 
were these criteria fulfilled. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIO _; 
A case may be termed " Jpe­
less" when there has been tab­
lished a firm diagnosis of a ,·ela­
tively chronic condition tha may 
be expected to terminate I tally 
because curative treatment is ither 
not known or not applicable. �om­
plex medico-moral problen are 
inevitable when this subject con­
sidered. 
Difficulties associated witl ther­
apy range from euthanasia, lhich 
is not licit, to unconscionab' pro­
longation of vital functions, ,·hich 
is not desirable. The phys. ,an is 
bound to employ "ordinary 1 .:ans" 
to preserve life but need nol resort 
to "extraordinary means." ! 1 gen­
eral, it is wiser to err on t! .: side 
of active therapy. 
Imparting pertinent dia., nostic 
and prognostic information is an­
other sensitive area. Whik there 
can be no absolute rule in this mat­
ter, there are forceful legal. psy­
chologic. medical, practical. ethical. 
and spiritual arguments in favor of 
suitably and adequately informing 
the patient and the family. The 
fundamental moral principle re· 
mains: Act always in the best in· 
terests of the patient. 
Human experimentation involv­
ing the hopelessly ill is not of itself 
forbidden, provided the ethical 
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strictures surrounding any human 
experimentation are observed. It is 
noted, however. that this form of 
human experimentation is fraught 
with the danger of self-deceit for 
the experimenter and of injustice 
to the subject. 
The most important spiritual 
aspect of the problem is concerned 
with the proper reception of the 
Last Sacraments by a Catholic pa­
tient, or with appropriate prepara­
tion for death by a non-Catholic 
patient. 
EPILOGUE 
It must by now be apparent that 
"hopeless case" is a misnomer ap­
plied to a patient for whom the 
physician has little hope. It does 
not, however, represent the judg­
ment of the patient. For there are 
no "hopeless" patients. only hope­
less doctors. Even the suicide dies 
hoping for something better. With 
this in mind, then, it would seem 
desirable to expunge this term 
from the lexicon of medicine, since 
it introduces unwarranted emo­
tional elements and serves as an 
obstruction not only to the care 
of the patient but also to the prog­
ress of medicine. 
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